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The physical or absolute geography of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is often blamed for its poor 
economic performance. A country’s location however not only determines its absolute 
geography, it also pins down its relative position on the globe vis-à-vis other countries. This 
paper assesses the importance of relative geography, and access to foreign markets in 
particular, in explaining the substantial income differences between SSA countries. We base 
our empirical analysis on a new economic geography model. We first construct a measure of 
each SSA country’s market access based on bilateral trade flows and then assess the relevance 
of market access for economic development. In doing so, we explicitly distinguish between 
the importance of access to other SSA markets and to the rest of world respectively. We find 
that market access, and notably intra-SSA market access, has a significant positive effect on 
GDP per capita. This indicates that improving SSA market access (e.g. by investing in intra- 
SSA infrastructure or through increased SSA integration) will have substantial positive effects 
on its future economic development. 
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1. Introduction 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is home to the world’s poorest countries. Alongside factors as poor 
institutional quality, low (labour) productivity and low levels of human capital, the region’s 
geographical disadvantages are often viewed as an important determinant of its dismal 
economic performance. It is well-established that a country’s geography may directly affect 
economic development through its effect on disease burden, agricultural productivity, and the 
availability of natural resources (see Gallup et al., 1999; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Ndulu, 
2007). Geography can also indirectly affect economic development through its influence on 
institutional quality (Rodrik et al., 2004; Gallup et al., 1999) or by determining a country’s 
transport costs (Limao and Venables, 2001; Amjadi and Yeats, 1995). Recently, the new 
economic geography (NEG) literature (see Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al, 1999) has, however, 
highlighted another mechanism through which geography could affect a country’s prosperity. 
A country’s location not only determines its absolute (or 1
st nature) geography; it also pins 
down its position on the globe vis-à-vis all other countries (its relative or 2
nd nature 
geography). This determines the type and importance of a country’s international relations 
that in turn can leave their mark on its economic development. The NEG literature in 
particular emphasizes the role of relative geography as the main determinant of a country’s 
access to international markets that in turn has an important effect on the country’s level of 
income
1.  
Redding and Venables (2004) were among the first to establish empirically that market 
access indeed matters for economic development
2. Based on the estimation results for a 
sample of 101 countries, they find for example that were Zimbabwe to be located in central 
Europe, the resulting improvement in its market access would ceteris paribus increase its GDP 
per capita by almost 80%. Similarly, halving the distance between Zimbabwe and all its 
trading partners would boost its GDP per capita by 27%, while direct access to the sea would 
increase it by 24%. Following Redding and Venables (2004), several studies have confirmed 
the positive effect of market access on economic development. These papers all focus on 
regional economic development. Knaap (2006) finds a strong positive effect of market access 
on income levels when looking at US states, and Breinlich (2006) finds the same for 
European regions. Also in case of developing countries, the positive effect of market access 
has been confirmed (see Deichmann, Lall, Redding and Venables, 2008 for a good overview). 
                                                 
1 Market access may also have indirectly affect income levels through its positive effect on education or skill 
level (see Redding and Schott, 2004 and also Breinlich, 2006). We will come back to this in section 6. 
2 Redding and Venables (2004, p.77-78).   3
Amiti and Cameron (2007) show that wages are higher in Indonesian districts that enjoy 
better market access, and Hering and Poncet (2007) find similar evidence in case of Chinese 
cities. Moreover, Amiti and Javorcik (2008) find that market access positively affects the 
amount of FDI in Chinese provinces and Lall, Shalizi and Deichmann (2004) show that 
market access is an important determinant of firm level productivity in India. The only paper, 
we know of, focusing on the role of market access in SSA is Elbadawi, Mengistae and 
Zeufack (2006) that shows that differences in terms of export performance between firms in 
10 SSA countries and firms in other developing countries (e.g. India, China, Malaysia or 
Peru) can partly be explained by SSA’s poor market access. The importance of relative 
geography in shaping global and regional patterns of economic development has also not 
gone unnoticed in policy circles; it is even the main topic of the World Bank’s 2009 World 
Development Report
3.  
Despite the attention given to the role of relative geography, and market access in 
particular, in shaping the differences in economic development observed between countries 
and/or regions in both the developing and developed world, we are unaware of a study that 
clearly establishes its role in explaining the differences in economic development observed 
between SSA countries. The paper by Elbadawi et al. (2006) mentioned above looks at the 
role of market access on export performance at the firm level: it does not link export 
performance – or market access – to income per capita. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap 
and find provide evidence on the importance of market access for economic development 
across SSA.  
SSA is only a marginal player on the world’s export and import markets. Since 1970, 
the region’s share in global trade (exports plus imports) has declined from about 4% to a mere 
2% in 2005 (IMF, 2007). Through their detrimental effect on market access, high trade costs 
are generally viewed as one of the main causes for its poor trade performance (see Collier, 
2002; Foroutan and Pritchett, 1993; Coe and Hoffmaister, 1999; Limao and Venables, 2001; 
Amjadi and Yeats, 1995 and Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2008). Increasing SSA participation 
in world markets is viewed as very important to its future economic success (IMF, 2007; 
World Bank 2007). It will not only alleviate the constraint of small domestic market size 
faced by most African countries (Collier and Venables, 2007), it is also expected to increase 
overall SSA productivity through increased knowledge spillovers and learning by doing 
                                                 
3See http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/EXTWDR2009/0,, 
contentMDK:21547034~menuPK:4231158~pagePK:64167689~piPK:64167673~theSitePK:4231059,00.html 
for an overview of the project.   4
resulting from being active in export markets (Van Biesebroeck, 2005; Bigsten and 
Söderbom, 2006). As a result, improving the region’s market access by investing in 
infrastructure, increasing regional integration and providing preferential access to European 
and US markets is seen as a vital ingredient for improving the trade potential of SSA and its 
overall economic performance (IMF, 2007; World Bank, 2007; Collier and Venables, 2007; 
Buys et al., 2006).  
Against this background the main contribution of our paper is to empirically establish 
the importance of SSA market access for its economic development. Following the empirical 
strategy introduced by Redding and Venables (2004) that is firmly based in the new economic 
geography (NEG) literature, we first construct each SSA country’s market access over the 
period 1993-2003 making use of bilateral manufacturing trade data involving at least one SSA 
country. Making use of bilateral trade data to construct market access allows us to establish 
the importance of trade costs and market size respectively as determinants of each country’s 
trade potential. Because SSA countries trade far more with the rest of the world (ROW) than 
with each other (see e.g.  IMF, 2007) and have even been found to undertrade with each other 
(Limao and Venables, 2001)
4, we focus explicitly on the determinants of intra-SSA trade as 
well as SSA trade with the rest of the world (ROW). Our results show that poor infrastructure 
across the continent (see also Amjadi and Yeats (1995), Limao and Venables (2001) and 
Longo and Sekkat, 2004), the civil unrest experienced by many SSA countries, and the fact 
that those countries with direct access to the sea (and island nations in particular) are much 
more oriented towards the ROW, are part of the explanation for this ‘ROW-bias’ in SSA 
trade. 
Next, having constructed the various measures of market access, we estimate the 
impact of market access on GDP per capita for our sample of 48 SSA countries. In particular 
we hereby distinguish between the relevance of SSA market access to other SSA markets and 
to markets in the ROW respectively. Also, a nice feature of our data set is that it allows for 
the use of panel data estimation techniques. We show that this is quite important when trying 
to establish the relevance of market access, as cross-section studies are likely to overstate the 
importance of market access. Overall, our main findings are that market access, and notably 
intra-SSA market access, has a significant positive effect on GDP per capita. Moreover, and in 
line with Redding and Schott (2003) and Breinlich (2006), we find evidence of an indirect 
effect of market access on economic development through its positive effect on human 
                                                 
4 Although the latter is not undisputed, see e.g. Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) and Subramanian and Tamarisa 
(2003).   5
capital. Our results finally show that (policy induced) changes in for instance SSA 
infrastructure (see also Buys et al. 2006) can indeed have strong positive effects on improving 
market access and thereby on enhancing economic prosperity across SSA. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly set out the new 
economic geography model underlying our empirical analysis, focusing on the specification 
of the wage equation and the trade equation that are the two equations we will estimate in 
section 4 and 5. Section 3 introduces our data set. In section 4, and as the first step of our 
estimation strategy, a trade equation is estimated using bilateral trade flows involving at least 
one SSA country. Next, and based on the trade estimation results, we construct our market 
access variables in section 5 and present our baseline results with respect to the impact of 
market access on GDP per capita for SSA. In section 6 we first provide various robustness 
checks, next analyze the relationship between human capital and market access in some more 
detail for SSA, and finally conduct some thought experiments to establish how various policy-
measures and shocks affect economic development in SSA through their effect on market 
access. Section 7 concludes.         
 
2.  The NEG model: wage equation, trade costs and market access
5 
We start by briefly setting out the new economic geography (NEG) model that underlies our 
empirical framework. Assume the world consists of i = 1,...,R countries, each being home to 
an agricultural and a manufacturing sector. As in virtually all NEG models, we focus on the 
manufacturing sector
6. Moreover, and in line with e.g. Redding and Venables (2004), 
Breinlich (2006), Knaap (2006) and Head and Mayer (2006), we restrict our attention to the 
‘short-run’ version of the model. This amounts to, as Redding and Venables (2004) p.59 put it 
“taking the location of expenditure and production as given and asking the question what 
wages can manufacturing firms in each location afford to pay its workers” (see also 
Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm (2006) on this important assumption when taking NEG 
models to the data).  
In the manufacturing sector, firms operate under internal increasing returns to scale, 
represented by a fixed input requirement ciF and a marginal input requirement ci. Each firm 
produces a different variety of the same good under monopolistic competition using the same 
                                                 
5 See Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999), Puga (1999) or Head and Mayer (2004) for more detailed 
expositions on how the equilibrium wage equation and consequently market access can be derived from the 
various basic NEG models.  
6 The agricultural sector uses labor and land to produce a freely tradable good under perfect competition that acts 
as the numéraire good.    6
Cobb-Douglas technology combining two different inputs. The first is an internationally 
immobile factor (labor), with price wi and input share β, the second is an internationally 
mobile factor with price vi and input share γ, where γ + β = 1
7.  
Manufacturing firms sell their products to all countries and this involves shipping 
them to foreign markets incurring trade costs in the process. These trade costs are assumed to 
be of the iceberg-kind and the same for each variety produced. In order to deliver a quantity 
xij(z) of variety z produced in country i to country j, xij(z)Tij has to be shipped from country i. 
A proportion (Tij-1) of output ‘is paid’ as trade costs (Tij = 1 if trade is costless). Note that this 
relatively simple iceberg specification (introduced mainly for ease of modeling purposes, see 
Fingleton and McCann, 2007) does not specify in any way what trade costs are composed of
8. 
Taking these trade costs into account gives the following profit function for each firm in 
country i, 
() () / [ () ]
RR
ii j i j i j i i i i j
jj
p zx z T wvcF x z
βγ π =− + ∑∑       ( 1 )  
where pij(z) is the price of a variety produced in country i. 
Turning to the demand side, consumers combine each firm’s manufacturing variety in 
a CES-type utility function, with σ being the elasticity of substitution between each pair of 
product varieties. Given this CES-assumption, it follows directly that in equilibrium all 
manufacturing varieties produced in country i are demanded by country j in the same quantity 
(for this reason varieties are no longer explicitly indexed by (z)). Denoting country j’s 
expenditure on manufacturing goods as Ej, country j’s demand for each product variety 
produced in country i can be shown to be, 
(1 )
ij ij j j xp E G
σσ −− =             ( 2 )  
where Gj is the price index for manufacturing varieties that follows from the assumed CES-
structure of consumer demand for manufacturing varieties. It is defined over the prices, pij, of 
all goods produced in country i = 1,...,R and sold in country j, 
                                                 
7 In Redding and Venables (2004) and Knaap (2006) each firm also uses a composite intermediate input (made 
up of all manufacturing varieties) in production, allowing them to also look at the relevance of so-called supplier 
access for income levels. Since our goal is to establish the relevance of market access we, in line with Breinlich 
(2006), skip intermediate inputs and thereby ignore supplier access [this also has the advantage that we avoid the 
severe multicollinearity problems when including both market and supplier access in the estimations, see 
Redding and Venables (2004) and Knaap (2006)]. In this respect our derivation and application of the wage 
equation is closer to Hanson (2005), see also Head and Mayer (2004, pp. 2622-2624). 
8 When estimating the effect of several trade cost related variables in section 4, we will need to specify a trade 












⎣⎦ ∑        ( 3 )  
Maximization of profits (1) combined with demand as specified in (2) gives the well-known 
result in the NEG literature that firms in a particular country set the same f.o.b. price, pi,  
depending only on the cost of production in location i, i.e. pi is a constant markup over 
marginal costs: 
  /( 1) ii i i pw v c
βγσσ =−          ( 4 )  
As a result, price differences between countries of a good produced in country i can only arise 
from differences in trade costs, i.e. pij = piTij. 
Next, free entry and exit drive (maximized) profits to zero, pinpointing equilibrium 
output per firm at  (1 ) x F σ =− . Combining equilibrium output with equilibrium price (4) and 
equilibrium demand (2), and noting that in equilibrium the price of the internationally 
(perfectly) mobile primary factor of production will be the same across countries (vi = v for 
all i), gives the equilibrium manufacturing wage: 
1
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       ( 5 )  
where A is a constant that contains inter alia the substitution elasticity, σ, and the fixed costs 
of production, F).  
Equation (5) is the wage equation that lies at the heart of virtually all empirical NEG 
studies (see e.g. Hanson, 2005; Redding and Venables, 2004; Knaap, 2006 and Amiti and 
Cameron, 2007).  It predicts that the wage level a country is able to pay is a function of a 
country’s level of technology, ci, that determines marginal costs, and, most importantly for 
our present purposes, so-called real market access MAi: a trade cost weighted sum of all 
countries’ market capacities. Or put differently, country j’s contribution to country i’s market 
access, MAij, is country j’s market capacity weighted by the level of trade costs involved when 
shipping goods from country i to country j, i.e. 
11
ij j j ij MAE G T
σ σ − − = . Note that market access 
stresses an important role of relative geography: the closer (or better connected) a country is 
to world markets, the higher its market access. It is Equation (5) that constitutes the backbone 
of our empirical analysis into the relevance of market access for SSA economic development 
in section 5 and 6.   8
Basically two estimation strategies have been proposed to estimate the parameters of 
the wage equation (5). The first strategy follows Hanson (2005) and estimates the wage 
equation directly either using non-linear estimation techniques or by estimating a linearized 
version of the wage equation, see e.g. Hanson (2005), Brakman et al (2004) and Mion (2004). 
Here, and given that we have additional information on the ‘strength’ of countries’ economic 
interlinkages (i.e. trade), we opt for another strategy as first introduced by Redding and 
Venables (2004)
9. This second strategy involves a two-step procedure where in the first step 
the information contained in (bilateral) trade data is used to provide estimates of the role of 
trade costs and market and supplier capacity in determining a country’s market access. The 
connection between bilateral trade and market access follows directly from the NEG model. 
Aggregating the demand from consumers in country j for a good produced in country i, see 
(2), over all firms producing in country i, gives the following aggregate trade equation: 
 
 
1( 1 ) ( 1 )
ij
ij i i j j ij
MA
EX n p E G T
σ σσ −− − =
14 424 4 3
        ( 6 )  
Equation (6) says that exports EXij from country i to country j depend on the ‘supply capacity’ 
of the exporting country, 
1
ii np
σ −  (the product of the number of firms and their price 
competitiveness), the market capacity of the importing country, 
1
jj EG
σ −  (the product of its 
income multiplied by its price index, i.e. its real spending power), and the magnitude of 
bilateral trade costs  ij T  between the two countries. As real market access is made up of these 
market capacities, weighted by bilateral trade costs, see (5) and (6), one can construct a 
measure of each country’s market access using the estimated parameters of (6). This is exactly 
what we do in section 5, where we subsequently use this constructed market access variable in 
the 2
nd step of the estimation procedure: estimating equation (5) to establish the effect of 
market access on income levels.  
 
3. Data  set
10 
The data on SSA manufacturing trade that we use in the first step of the estimation procedure, 
are collected from CEPII’s Trade and Production Database
11, which contains information on 
bilateral manufacturing trade flows from 1976-2002. Within this dataset we focus on bilateral 
                                                 
9 Other papers using this strategy include inter alia Knaap (2006), Breinlich (2006), Head and Mayer (2006), 
Hering and Poncet (2006). 
10 See Appendix A, for a full list of all the variables (including data sources) that we use in our analysis. 
11 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/TradeProd.htm. An explanation of the dataset is given at 
http://www.cepii.fr/tradeprod/TradeProd_cepii.xls.    9
trade flows involving at least one SSA country (exporter or importer). Given poor data 
availability before 1993 (over this period SSA manufacturing import data are only given for 6 
SSA countries
12), we focus on the 10-year period 1993-2002. This leaves us with a data set 
containing information on bilateral manufacturing trade flows for 44 SSA countries both to 
and from other SSA countries and to and from 148 countries in the rest of the world (ROW). 
A nice feature of the data set is that it also contains information on some countries’ internal 
trade, i.e. the amount that a country trades with itself (measured as total production minus 
total exports). After dropping missing observations, we are left with a total sample of 78748 
observations (8574 intra-SSA, 70083 SSA-ROW and 91 internal trade observations).  
  As determinants of SSA trade that are related to market and supplier capacity, recall 
trade equation (6), we collected information on each country’s GDP, % rural population, % 
workforce in agriculture and the incidence of civil war and/or conflict. As measures of trade 
costs, we use data on bilateral distances, internal distance, language similarity, sharing a 
common colonizer, having had a colony - colonizer relationship, being landlocked, being an 
island, sharing a common language, an index of infrastructural quality; and membership of an 
African regional or free trade agreement.  
Table 1 provides a list of the SSA countries in our sample, also indicating (*) for 
which countries we do not have any information on bilateral manufacturing trade flows. 
 
Table 1 : SSA countries 
Angola Côte  d’Ivoire  Liberia  Senegal 
Benin Djibouti  Madagascar  Seychelles 
Botswana*  Equatorial Guinea  Malawi  Sierra Leone
BurkinaFaso Eritrea Mali  Somalia 
Burundi Ethiopia  Mauritania  South  Africa 
Cameroon Gabon  Mauritius  Sudan 
Cape Verde  Gambia  Mozambique  Swaziland* 
Central African Republic  Ghana  Namibia*  Tanzania 
Chad Guinea  Niger  Togo 
Comoros Guinea-Bissau  Nigeria  Uganda 
Congo Kenya  Rwanda  Zambia 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo  Lesotho*  Sao Tome and Principe Zimbabwe 
Notes : * denotes not in the trade sample. 
 
In the second stage of our analysis in section 5, we will complement the above data with data 
for 48 SSA countries on GDP per capita that we use as our proxy for wages
13 (see also 
                                                 
12 South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, the Comoros, Malawi and Madagascar. 
13 Using GDP per worker instead invariably gives the same results but we loose an additional 8 observations in 
the process. This and the fact that Redding and Venables (2004) also use GDP per capita, made us decide to 
show the results using GDP per capita. Results using GDP per worker are available upon request.   10
Redding and Venables, 2004), human capital measures (most notably adult illiteracy), and a 
measure for economic density (working population density per km
2 of arable land). Also we 
have collected information on each country’s status as an oil producer, its primary product 
exports (ores and metals) – both being measures of a country’s degree of natural resource 
dependence – that we use in further robustness checks. 
 
4.  Step 1: Trade Estimation Results  
The starting point of our empirical analysis
14 is the trade equation (6) as derived from the 
NEG model in section 2. Rewriting (6) in loglinear form and allowing for a year-specific 
intercept gives: 
01 2 3 ln ln ln ln ijt t it jt ijt ijt EX Y Y T α αα α α ε =++ + + +     (7) 
where Y denotes a country’s GDP, and a subscript t is added to denote the year of observation.  
As has been mentioned before, the NEG-model does not specify trade costs Tijt in any way 
(except that they are of the iceberg type). In the absence of actual trade cost data and 
following the modern empirical trade and economic geography literature (see e.g. Anderson 
and van Wincoop, 2004; Limao and Venables, 2001; Redding and Venables, 2004), we 
specify trade costs, Tijt, to be a multiplicative
15 function of the following observable variables 
that are commonly used in the literature (see Appendix A for more details on each of the 
variables): bilateral distance (D), sharing a common border (B), a common language (CL), or 
a common colonial heritage [distinguishing between sharing a common colonizer (CC) and 
having had a colony-colonizer relationship (CR)], being landlocked (ll), being an island (isl), 
an index measuring the quality of infrastructure (inf) and membership of the same African 
regional or free trade agreement (RFTA). In loglinear form this amounts to the following trade 
costs specification: 
123 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
ln ln ln ln ln ln ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
it jt it jt it jt ijt
TDBC LC CC R
ll ll isl isl inf inf RFTA
χ χχ χ χ
χχχ χ χ χ χ
=++ + +
+++ + + + +
 (8) 
Besides including GDP as the standard trade determinant related to countries’ economic size, 
we also include the following additional variables in (7) that we think take account of some 
trade determinants that are to some extent typical of SSA. Given the fact that SSA has been 
the most conflict-ridden continent over the last few decades, we include two dummy variables 
                                                 
14 We note that all results presented in the paper are robust to the exclusion of South Africa from the sample. 
15 This is the usual choice in the gravity literature (see e.g. Limao and Venables, 2001; Subramanian and 
Tamarisa, 2003). See Hummels (2001) for a critique on this, arguing in favor of an additive specification instead.   11
that indicate whether a country experienced outbreaks of civil unrest (see Rupert, 2004) in a 
specific year: civil conflict (cconfl) or civil war (cwar); where civil war indicates more intense 
fighting than civil conflict. Next, we include the share of people living in rural areas (%rural). 
Manufacturing activity is usually located in or near urban centers; higher urbanization 
increases a country’s capacity to im- and export these goods. Also, Ancharaz (2003) shows 
that higher urbanization shares increase the likelihood of trade policy reform, and moreover, 
see Sahn and Stifel (2003), the welfare level of the urban population is generally higher than 
that of the rural population in SSA, resulting in higher demand for imported manufacturing 
products. Finally, we also include dummies for intra-SSA and internal trade (αssa,  αown) 
respectively, so that the trade specification that we estimate in the 1
st step of our analysis is: 
01 2 4
56 7 8 9
ln ln ln ln %
%
ijt SSA own t it jt ijt it
jt it jt it jt ijt
EX Y Y T rural
rural cconfl cconfl cwar cwar
α ααα α α α
α ααα α ε
=+ + ++ + + +
++ + + + +
   (9) 
with lnTijt as in (8). 
  Some related studies do not have to choose the specific variables that capture a 
country’s market capacity by opting instead for the inclusion of importer and exporter fixed 
effects when estimating the trade equation, see e.g. Breinlich (2006) and Knaap (2006). We, 
however, decided to explicitly specify the country-specific determinants of trade (see also 
Elbadawi et al., 2004; and §7 in Redding and Venables, 2004) for the following three reasons. 
First, as explained in Bosker and Garretsen (2007), these importer and exporter fixed effects 
also capture all trade cost related variables that are country-specific. The constructed market 
access term only includes the importer fixed effects (see Redding and Venables, 2004), and as 
a result it ignores the exporter-specific trade costs. Second, as pointed out by Redding and 
Venables (2004, p.75), using importer and exporter fixed effects does not allow one “to 
quantify the effects on per capita income of particular country characteristics (for example, 
landlocked or infrastructure), since all such effects are contained in the dummies” (Redding 
and Venables, 2004, p. 75). As a result, recommendations regarding the effect of country-
specific policies (see section 6.3) aimed at e.g. lowering trade costs, are impossible to make. 
Third, as bilateral trade data are missing for 4 SSA countries (see Table 1), we would not be 
able to estimate the importer and exporter effect for these four countries. As a result these 
countries would also not be considered when constructing the various market access 
variables. When using country-specific characteristics instead, this can be avoided: we can 
use the estimated parameters from the first step in combination with these four countries’ 
characteristics to construct the market access contributions for each of these countries even in   12
the absence of these countries’ bilateral trade data (of course given that we do have data on 
these country characteristics). 
The actual estimation of (9) is, however, not without problems. In particular, the 
presence of zero trade flows complicates matters. As shown in Bosker (2008), about half of 
the observed bilateral SSA manufacturing trade flows are zeroes
16. To deal with these zero 
observations one can choose between several estimation strategies that each have their 
(dis)advantages (see also footnote 19). Referring to Bosker (2008) for a detailed exposition of 
the pro’s and con’s of (and the results using) different estimation strategies, here we use a 
Heckman 2-step estimation strategy (see also Helpman et al., 2007) to estimate the parameters 
of (9). Doing so we do not have to impose exogenous sample selection, i.e. that there is no 
unobserved variable related to both the probability to trade and the amount of trade, as e.g. 
discarding the zero observations and applying OLS on the non-zeroes only does. Nor, do we 
have to assume a priori that the exact same model explains both the probability to trade and 
the amount of trade, as using Tobit or estimating (9) in its non-linear form (6) using either 
NLS or pseudo-Poisson techniques would imply
17.  
The Heckman 2-step procedure amounts to first estimating, using probit, how each of 
the variables affects the probability to trade. Next, in the second stage, the effect of each 
variable on the amount of trade is estimated, including the inverse Mills ratio (that is 
constructed using the results from the first step) to control for endogenous selection bias that 
would plague the results when simply discarding the non-zero observations (see for instance 
ch.17 in Wooldridge, 2003). However, using the Heckman 2-step procedure is also not free of 
assumptions
18: the results when using this 2-step procedure are more convincing when one 
uses an exclusion restriction, i.e. having at least one variable that determines the probability to 
trade but not the amount of trade (see p.589 Wooldridge, 2003). To this end, we decided to 
                                                 
16This number of zeroes in bilateral trade flows does not mean that the manufacturing sector is unimportant in 
SSA countries: on average about 30% of SSA GDP is generated in the manufacturing sector (compared to 20% 
in agriculture), and manufacturing exports and imports constitute a respective 37% and 68% of total SSA exports 
and imports [source: World Development Indicators 2008]. Moreover developing the (exporting) manufacturing 
sector is viewed by many as crucial to the region’s chances on future economic success (IMF, 2007; World 
Bank, 2007). 
17 Also, given that the NEG model in section 2 in principle implies that each country trades at least something 
with each other country, using the NEG trade equation in explaining both the zero and the non-zero trade flows 
ascribes the zero observations to the error term only (relying on arguments of measurement error or reporting 
errors, see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, p.643). 
18 At this point we also note that our baseline results regarding the relevance of market access (i.e. its 
significance) are not affected when constructing market access based on estimating the trade equation (9) 
assuming exogenous sample selection instead and using OLS on the non-zero trade observations.  The 
magnitude of the effect tends to be somewhat larger. See Appendix B, for the results of estimating (9) using OLS 
on the non-zero trade sample and for the baseline results on the relevance of market access when using market 
access constructed using those estimates.   13
use the percentage of the labor force employed in agriculture. We assume that this variable 
(after correcting for the other included variables!) does not affect the amount of trade but only 
the probability to trade. The reasoning for using this variable, and again referring to Bosker 
(2008) for a much more detailed exposition of both the econometric validity
19 and economic 
validity of our choice, is that it has been shown by inter alia Temple and Wößmann (2006) 
and Poirson (2001) that a lower share of the labor force employed in agriculture increases 
aggregate total factor productivity. When looked upon as a proxy of the economy’s aggregate 
productivity, the fact that the percentage of the labor force in agriculture only affects the 
probability that a SSA economy exports or imports manufacturing goods, can be viewed as 
being consistent with trade theories of the Melitz (2003) type emphasizing productivity as a 
major determinant of the probability to trade (see also e.g. Hallak, 2006 and Helpman et al., 
2007 for a similar line of reasoning).  
Table 2 shows the estimation results, where the marginal effects give the overall 
effects of each of the included variables on the amount of trade (after taking the 1
st stage into 
account) and the results for 0/1 trade refer to the 1
st stage probit estimations. To explicitly 
allow for a different effect of a particular variable on intra-SSA and SSA trade with the rest of 
the world, we have interacted several variables with a dummy-variable taking the value of 1 
when considering intra-SSA trade. In Table 2, adding “ssa” after a certain variable denotes 
that variable interacted with this intra-SSA trade dummy. Significance of an “ssa”-variable 
indicates a different effect of that particular variable on intra-SSA trade than on SSA trade 
with the ROW. Also, as argued in Bosker and Garretsen (2007), we allow distance to have a 
different effect when considering internal trade, hereby explicitly estimating the possibly 
different effect of distance on internal trade instead of simply postulating a difference (as in 
Redding and Venables, 2004) or assuming no difference (as in e.g. Breinlich (2006) and 
Knaap, 2006). 
The main insights from the results reported in Table 2 are as follows
20. First the 
outcomes for the non-trade cost related variables. Importer and exporter GDP both have the 
expected positive sign. More interesting, the trade-stimulating effect of an increase in GDP is 
much lower when considering intra-SSA trade, suggesting that as SSA countries get richer the 
focus of their manufacturing trade activity shifts away from other SSA countries in favor of 
                                                 
19 The econometric validity hinges on the significance of the Mills ratio in Table 2 and on noting the fact that % 
labor force in agriculture is not significant in an OLS regression using the non-zero trade flows only (see Table 
A2 in Appendix B). 
20 Although reported, the results of the first stage probit estimation are not explicitly discussed here. See Bosker, 
2008 for a more detailed discussion of these results.   14
countries in the ROW. Civil unrest negatively affects trade, and the more so the more violent 
it becomes (compare the parameters of the civil war dummies to those of the civil conflict 
dummies). Also as expected, a higher degree of urbanization results in more exports and 
imports of manufacturing goods. The effect on manufacturing exports is however much larger 
than on imports. Given that manufacturing in SSA is mostly located in urban areas and 
(unskilled) labor-intensive, an explanation for this last finding is that a higher level of 
urbanization suppresses wages due to the larger supply of unskilled labor. This lowers firms’ 
production costs making it easier for them to be competitive on world markets
21.  
 
Table 2 : The Trade Equation Estimates 
dependent variable                                                                ln trade 
Estimation method                                                       Heckman - 2step 
time period                                                             1993-2002 
Variable  marginal effects  0/1 - trade  variable  marginal effects  0/1 - trade 
ln distance  -1.478  -0.395  island exp  0.555  0.166 
ln internal distance  0.869*  0.430  island exp ssa  -2.177  -0.690 
ln distance ssa  -0.033**  -0.140  island imp  0.393  0.228 
ln GDP imp  1.385  0.464  island imp ssa  -1.504  -0.748 
ln GDP imp ssa  -0.427  -0.060  ln infrastructure exp  0.459  0.126 
ln GDP exp  1.531  0.436  ln infrastructure exp ssa 1.053  0.277 
ln GDP exp ssa  -0.250  -0.031  ln infrastructure imp  0.168  -0.013** 
colony – colonizer  2.470  1.702  ln infrastructure imp ssa 0.833  0.223 
common colonizer  1.094  0.309  RTA or FTA  -0.471**  0.013** 
common colonizer ssa  -0.079**  -0.011**  RTA or FTA ssa  1.489  0.085** 
Contiguity  -1.241  -0.272**  civil conflict imp  -0.538  -0.196 
Contiguity ssa  2.645  0.821  civil conflict exp  -0.599  -0.062 
common off language  0.858  0.289  civil war imp  -0.905  -0.322 
common off language ssa  -0.553  -0.164  civil war exp  -1.447  -0.368 
landlocked exp  -0.226  -0.229  % rural population imp  -0.343  -0.030** 
landlocked exp ssa  -0.765  -0.066**  % rural population exp  -2.985  -0.651 
landlocked imp  -0.294  0.039*  % in agriculture imp  -  -0.159 
landlocked imp ssa  0.334  -0.006**  % in agriculture exp  -  -0.119 
dummy ssa trade  13.021  3.371  dummy internal trade  2.413**  4.982 
            
nr observations                                                                74492 
Mills ratio [p-value]                                                           2.930 [0.000] 
Notes : ** (*) denotes NOT significant at the 5% (1%) respectively. 
 
Next, the effect of the different trade cost variables on SSA manufacturing trade. Starting with 
the results regarding the bilateral trade cost variables, we find the standard result that 
distance negatively affects the amount of trade between countries. More interesting, and in 
line with Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) but contrary to Limao and Venables (2001), we do not 
find evidence that the penalty on distance is higher for intra-SSA trade. Also, the results 
                                                 
21 Also, productivity (and hence international competitiveness) tends to be higher in urban areas due to positive 
spillovers or externalities associated with agglomeration economies (see Rosenthal and Strange, 2004).   15
clearly show the advantage of explicitly allowing for a different effect of distance on internal 
trade: the distance penalty is about 60% lower for internal trade compared to bilateral trade. 
For intra-SSA trade we find a clear positive effect of sharing a common border on trade flows 
(see e.g. Limao and Venables, 2001; Subramanian and Tamirisa, 2003 and Foroutan and 
Pritchett, 1993). For SSA-ROW trade we, however, find (surprisingly) a negative effect. 
When we take into consideration that the only SSA countries that border non-SSA countries 
are those bordering North African countries, this simply indicates that these SSA countries 
trade less with their North African neighbors than with non-African countries (see also IMF, 
2007). Sharing a colonial history has a strong positive effect on the amount of trade. 
Especially SSA trade with its former colonizer(s) is much higher than trade with other 
countries in the world. Having a common colonizer also boosts bilateral trade and we find no 
indication that the effect is different for intra-SSA trade compared to trade with the ROW. 
Sharing a common language stimulates both intra-SSA and SSA-ROW trade (see also 
Foroutan and Pritchett, 1993) and Coe and Hoffmaister, 1999). The trade facilitating effect of 
language similarity is much larger for trade with the rest of the world however (the common 
border and common colonizer variable may already be capturing some of the language effect 
in case of intra-SSA trade). A bilateral trade cost variable that is of particular interest is the 
variable capturing the effect of being a member of the same African regional or free trade 
agreement (RFTA). Intra-SSA trade in manufactures substantially benefits from having an 
RFTA, providing evidence in favor of those who argue for increased African integration (one 
of the explicit goals of e.g. the African Union). The finding that having an RFTA does not 
significantly affect SSA-ROW trade is not surprisingly since the only non-SSA countries 
being part of an all-African RFTA are some of the North African countries (see the earlier-
discussed results regarding the common border variable). 
  Our results regarding the three country-specific trade cost variables, i.e. being 
landlocked, being an island, and the quality of a country’s infrastructure also show some 
interesting differences when comparing their impact on intra-SSA and SSA-ROW trade 
respectively. We find that being landlocked depresses both SSA imports and exports of 
manufacturing goods to the ROW, corroborating the findings in Coe and Hoffmaister (1999). 
When looking at intra-SSA trade, being landlocked affects intra-SSA exports even more 
negatively; on the contrary, being landlocked slightly increases the amount imported from 
other SSA countries. This difference is quite interesting, as it indicates that landlocked 
countries in SSA are more dependent on imported manufacturing goods from other SSA 
countries compared to the SSA countries that do have direct access to the sea. Being an island   16
nation increases trade with the ROW, confirming findings by e.g. Limao and Venables 
(2001). Intra-SSA is much lower for these same island nations. Apparently, the island nations 
of SSA (Mauritius, Comoros, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe) are oriented away 
from the African mainland when it comes to trade. These findings suggest that SSA countries 
are much more oriented towards the ROW than towards other SSA countries: island nations 
trade much less with the African mainland and countries with direct access to the sea import 
more manufacturing goods from the ROW than from other SSA countries (see also the results 
on the GDP variables).  
The final trade cost related variable that we consider is the quality of a country’s 
infrastructure that is arguably the most interesting variable from a policy perspective given 
the large amounts of funds currently allocated by donors to (co-)finance infrastructure 
improvements in SSA ($7.7 billion by members of The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa 
alone
22). In line with the results in Limao and Venables (2001), and Buys et al. (2006) we find 
that improved quality of infrastructure has large positive effects on the amount of trade. Even 
more interestingly, improving the quality of infrastructure has a much larger positive effect on 
intra-SSA trade than on SSA trade with the ROW. These findings show that the current focus 
on improving SSA infrastructure (see e.g. the aim of the Sub-Saharan African Transport 
Policy Program
23 and The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa
17) is warranted.  
 
5.  Step 2: Constructing Market Access and Baseline Results 
5.1  Constructing market access from the trade estimations 
Having estimated the effects of both the trade-cost related and the market capacity related 
variables on the amount of trade, we are now in a position to construct market access for each 
of the 48 SSA countries in our sample. More specifically, we use the estimated coefficients 
shown in Table 2 and the relationship between the trade equation in (6) and market access in 
(5) to construct market access as follows, distinguishing explicitly between the respective 
contribution of internal market access, SSA market access and ROW market access to a 
country’s total market access:   
 
own SSA ROW
it it it it MA MA MA MA =++        ( 1 0 )  
                                                 
22 See http://www.icafrica.org/fileadmin/documents/AR2006/ICA_Annual_Report_-_Volume_1_-
_FINAL_March_2007.pdf. 
23 For more info see: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/ 
EXTAFRREGTOPTRA/EXTAFRSUBSAHTRA/0,,menuPK:1513942~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~the
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k α  and  ˆ
ssa
k χ  capture the estimated effect of a variable on intra-SSA trade (i.e. the 
coefficient on a variable plus the coefficient on that variable interacted with the intra-SSA 
dummy). 
Using (10) and (11), we construct total market access (MA), SSA market access (SSA-
MA), ROW market access (ROW-MA) and own market access (own-MA) for each of the 48 
SSA countries in each year during our sample period 1993-2002. Table 3 shows average (log) 
total market access along with the share of each of its subcomponents, and the average SSA 
GDP per capita for each of the years in our sample.  
 
Table 3 : Market Access (shares) and GDP per capita over time 
year  ln avg MA  % row  % ssa  % own  GDP per capita 
1993 24.23  8.9  69.7  21.4  2342 
1994 24.24  9.0  70.2  20.7  2334 
1995 24.33  9.3  69.9  20.9  2353 
1996 24.12  9.3  69.0  21.7  2394 
1997 24.03  10.2  67.6  22.2  2462 
1998 24.04  8.9  68.4  22.7  2534 
1999 24.11  9.6  67.6  22.8  2567 
2000 24.12  12.1  62.5  25.3  2633 
2001 24.49  11.3  63.4  25.3  2559 
2002 24.48  11.4  63.3  25.4  2661 
% change 1993-2002  28.61  2.5  -6.5  4.0  13.64 
average yearly % change  1.40  0.3  -0.7  0.4  1.30 
 
Average market access has improved at an annual rate of 1.4%, slightly higher than the 
average annual growth rate of GDP per capita. Looking at the three subcomponents of 
market access shows that SSA market access dominates total market access, and this reflects   18
in part the high penalty on distance in SSA trade and the positive border effect (see Table 2). 
The share of SSA trade has, however, decreased from around 70% in 1993 to about 63% in 
2002. ROW and own market access have both been gaining in importance in total market 
access. The fact that the ROW’s share in market access has been on the rise partly reflects 
that the ROW experienced (on average) higher GDP growth than SSA. Combined with the 
higher coefficient on ROW GDP (see Table 2), this has increased ROW market access faster 
than SSA market access. The increase in own market access can also be ascribed to the 
higher coefficient on GDP in own market access compared to that in SSA market access, but 
also to the much smaller penalty on internal distance (see Table 2) plays a role here. 
 
Figure 1: Market Access and distance to major markets 
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Notes:  the raw correlation between log distance to the USA and log ROW market access is (p-values in 
brackets): -0.09 (0.05) and that between log distance to South Africa and log SSA market access is –0.42 (0.00).  
 
Figure 1 illustrates in some more detail the role of distance to major markets as a determinant 
of market access. The left panel plots for each SSA country its ROW-market access against 
the distance to the United States, and the right panel plots for each country its SSA-market 
access against the distance to South Africa
24. It shows that in both cases market access is 
lower for those countries at greater distance from the United States and South Africa 
respectively. This effect is, however, much more pronounced when considering SSA market 
access and the distance to South Africa, which is in part due to the fact that besides the USA 
also Europe (and increasingly also Asia) constitutes a large market for SSA products. Figure 
1 also shows that some of SSA countries with the worst access to markets in the ROW are 
landlocked (e.g. Chad, the Central African Republic, Rwanda), whereas the island nations 
(e.g. Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros and Cape Verde) tend to have the best access to non-
                                                 
24 Besides countries close to South Africa also those countries close to Africa’s second largest economy, Nigeria, 
tend to have higher SSA market access. Scatter plot available upon request.   19
SSA markets. When considering SSA market access, these same island nations are doing 
much worse. The landlocked countries are again among the countries with the worst SSA 
market access. Finally we note that those countries experiencing civil conflict or, worse still, 
civil war, e.g. Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, or Angola, tend to be 
among the countries with the lowest SSA as well as ROW market access. 
 
5.2  The relevance of market access for GDP per capita in SSA:  baseline results 
Now that we have constructed the various measures of market access for all 48 SSA countries 
in our sample, we can assess the effect of market access on GDP per capita. Before we turn to 
the actual estimation of the wage equation (5), Figure 2 plots mean market access (TOTAL, 
ROW+SSA
25, ROW, and SSA market access) for the period 1993-2002 against mean GDP 
per capita over that same period.  
 
Figure 2: Market Access and GDP per capita in SSA 
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mean total market access (logs)
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mean row+ssa market access (logs)
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mean row market access (logs)
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mean ssa market access (logs)
 
Notes: the raw correlations of each of the market access variants are (p-values in parentheses): total: 0.44 (0.00); 
row + ssa: 0.31 (0.00); row: 0.38 (0.00); ssa: 0.28 (0.00). 
 
                                                 
25 Note that this is basically “Foreign Market Access” as used in e.g. Redding and Venables (2004) or Breinlich 
(2006) as it excludes access to a country’s own market.   20
Figure 2 shows a clear positive relationship between GDP per capita and market access. Also, 
SSA-market access seems somewhat less important compared to ROW market access (see the 
reported correlations below Figure 1).  
Taking logs on both sides of the wage equation (5) from the NEG model in section 2, 
we arrive at the log-linear relationship between market access and wages that we will estimate 
using panel data techniques: 
 
  01 ln ln it it it wM A β βη =+ +        ( 1 2 )  
 
In line with Redding and Venables (2004, p.63) and Breinlich (2006), we proxy wages (the 
price of the immobile factor of production) by GDP per capita [see also footnote 14]. The 
error term  it η  includes ci a country’s the level of technological efficiency. Again following 
Redding and Venables (2004), we start by assuming that these cross-country differences in 
technology are captured by an idiosyncratic error term (implicitly only allowing for other 
variables determining technological efficiency that are uncorrelated with our market access 
measure), and estimate (12) using pooled OLS. The results are shown in the first four 
columns of Table 4
26. 
 
Table 4 : Market access and GDP per capita – first estimation results 
dep:  log  GDP  per  capita  ols ols ols ols ols ols ols ols 
log  tot  ma  0.258  - - -  0.063  - - - 
robust  0.000  - - -  0.005  - - - 
bootstrapped  0.000  - - -  0.010  - - - 
log  ssa+row  ma  -  0.186  - - -  0.031  - - 
robust  -  0.000  - - -  0.050  - - 
bootstrapped  -  0.000  - - -  0.073  - - 
log  row  ma  - -  0.461  - - -  0.032  - 
robust  - -  0.000  - - -  0.321  - 
bootstrapped  - -  0.000  - - -  0.373  - 
log  ssa  ma  - - -  0.153  - - -  0.031 
robust  - - -  0.000  - - -  0.036 
bootstrapped  - - -  0.000  - - -  0.049 
            
p-value  country  FE  no no no no  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
p-value  time  FE  no no no no  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000 
nr  observations  477 477 477 477 477 477 477 477 
R2  0.190 0.094 0.147 0.077 0.966 0.965 0.951 0.965 
Notes : p-values below coefficients. Bootstrapped p-values on the basis of 200 replications. 
Results for the constant and the time- and country fixed effects are not shown to save space. 
 
                                                 
26 Following Breinlich (2006), Knaap (2006) and Redding and Venables (2004), we show both robust and 
bootstrapped standard errors for all our estimation results. The bootstrapped standard errors take explicit account 
of the fact that our measures of market access are all generated regressors, see Redding and Venables (2004, p. 
64) for more details.   21
The estimated market access coefficient is positive and significant for each of the four 
measures of market access, indicating a positive effect of market access on GDP per capita 
across SSA. An increase of total market access by 1% would increase GDP per capita by 
0.25%. Also, when considering only foreign market access (ROW+SSA market access 
excludes own market access), we find a positive (but somewhat smaller) effect of market 
access. When considering only SSA or only ROW market access, we find an interesting 
difference. The estimated coefficient on ROW market access is much higher that that on SSA 
market access, and also ROW market access on its own explains about twice as much of the 
SSA-variance in GDP per capita than SSA market access does. This suggests that it is above 
all improved market access to non-SSA countries that will boost economic development in 
SSA, thereby seemingly vindicating those studies that proclaim that intra-SSA economic 
linkages are too weak and under-developed to be of importance to SSA countries.  
The estimation results in the first 4 columns of Table 4 are, however, only valid under 
the earlier-mentioned assumption of idiosyncratic differences in country’s technological 
efficiency that are uncorrelated with market access. As this assumption is likely to be 
violated, we subsequently make use of the panel data nature of our data set. We include 
country fixed effects to capture country-specific variables affecting a country’s technological 
efficiency that do not vary over time. Most notably we hereby control for the effect of 
absolute (or 1
st nature) geography (climate, soil quality, etc) that is, as we discussed in the 
introduction, often blamed for Africa’s poor development. But it arguably also controls for a 
country’s institutional quality
27 (see Breinlich, 2006). By also including time (year) fixed 
effects, we take account of shocks that are affecting all countries similarly, such as the 
availability of technological innovations made in developed countries (the introduction of 
mobile phones, which have rapidly spread all over SSA, is a prime example). The last 4 
columns of Table 4 show the results of these fixed effects estimations. 
As can be seen from Table 4, the inclusion of fixed effects is quite important: the 
effect of total market access on GDP per capita is still positive and significant but the size of 
the market access coefficient is much lower: a 1% increase in a country’s total market access, 
now ‘only’ increases GDP per capita with 0.06%. In addition, when we split total market 
access in ROW+SSA-MA, ROW-MA and SSA-MA, we now observe that the coefficient on 
SSA market access is not different from that on ROW market access. Even more strikingly, 
                                                 
27 Of course, institutional quality may change over time, but given our relatively short time span of 10 years and 
the fact that institutional change is general a very slow process, we are quite confident that we are capturing 
institutional quality to a large extent by allowing for country fixed effects.   22
when considering ROW market access only, it no longer has a significant impact on GDP per 
capita, whereas SSA market access still does have a significant effect. The significance of 
ROW+SSA-MA and also that of total MA seems to be largely due to market access to other 
SSA countries. Also note that both the country and time fixed effects are significant. 
The inclusion of these two fixed effects may still not provide us with accurate 
estimates of the effect of market access however. They only control for time-invariant 
country-specific or country-invariant time-specific variables. It is possible that a country’s 
technological efficiency is also determined by time- ànd country-varying variables that are 
correlated with market access. If this is the case, we would still obtain biased estimates of the 
coefficient on market access, even when allowing for country- and year fixed effects. 
Following Breinlich (2006), we therefore also include two variables, namely the adult 
illiteracy rate as a measure for a country’s human capital
28, and the working population 
density per km
2 of arable land
29, that both have been shown to affect a country’s productivity 
level and to be correlated with market access (see e.g. Ciccone and Hall (1996), Ciccone 
(2002), Redding and Schott (2003) and Breinlich, 2006).  
 
Table 5   Adding Human Capital and Employment Density: Baseline Results 
       BASELINE 
dep:  log  GDP  per  capita  ols ols ols ols ols ols ols ols 
log tot ma  0.160  -  -  -  0.076  -  -  - 
robust  0.000  - - -  0.001  - - - 
bootstrapped  0.000  - - -  0.004  - - - 
log  ssa+row  ma  - 0.088 -  -  - 0.053 -  - 
robust  - 0.000 -  -  - 0.004 -  - 
bootstrapped  - 0.000 -  -  - 0.007 -  - 
log row ma  -  -  0.352  -  -  -  0.083  - 
robust  - -  0.000  - - -  0.038  - 
bootstrapped  - -  0.000  - - -  0.043  - 
log ssa ma  -  -  -  0.072  -  -  -  0.050 
robust  - - -  0.000  - - -  0.003 
bootstrapped  - - -  0.000  - - -  0.005 
adult  illiteracy  -0.018 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.019 -0.017 -0.018 
robust  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.074 0.111 0.084 
bootstrapped  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.105 0.167 0.133 
log working pop / km2 arable land  0.108  0.091  0.047  0.089  0.294  0.300  0.320  0.304 
robust  0.004 0.011 0.206 0.013 0.050 0.044 0.032 0.042 
bootstrapped  0.004 0.000 0.331 0.029 0.063 0.079 0.058 0.046 
            
p-value  country  FE  no no no no  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
p-value time FE  no  no  no  no  0.320  0.395  0.419  0.385 
nr  observations  369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 
R2  0.401 0.356 0.412 0.352 0.966 0.965 0.965 0.966 
Notes : p-values below coefficients. Bootstrapped p-values on the basis of 200 replications. 
                                                 
28 In section 6.2, we focus in more detail on the relationship between human capital, market access and income. 
29 We use arable land, instead of total land because large parts of almost each SSA country are quite hostile to 
human settlement (e.g. the Sahara and Kalahari desert and the jungles in central Africa).    23
Table 5 shows the corresponding estimation results when we add these two control variables 
(with and without fixed effects)
 30. Compared to Table 4, the inclusion of human capital and 
working population density leads to the following changes. Without fixed effects, we observe 
that the coefficients on market access are much lower than in Table 4, confirming findings by 
Breinlich (2006), Hering and Poncet (2006) and Amiti and Cameron (2007) who also find that 
controlling for human capital and density leads to lower estimates for market access. When 
the county- and time- fixed effects are included, the size of the estimated market access 
coefficients drops even further (which is in line with the results shown in Table 4). This drop 
is again the largest for ROW market access, again indicating that the positive effect of ROW 
market access would be much overstated when not controlling for these effects (as for 
example a cross-section analysis would do). Note also that the time dummies are no longer 
significant which suggests that the time effects are picked up by our two (time-varying) 
controls. 
With regard to the different impact of each of the components of total market access, 
we find that all three components are significant and positively contributing to GDP per 
capita. ROW market access still has a larger impact on GDP per capita, although the 
difference with SSA market access is much smaller than in the first four columns of Table 4 
or Table 5. Given the fact that SSA market access’ contribution to total MA is much larger 
than that of ROW market access (see Table 3), the coefficient on ROW+SSA market access is 
about the same as that on SSA market access. Overall, a 1% increase in total market access 
increases GDP per capita by 0.08%, and when focussing only on SSA, ROW or foreign 
(SSA+ROW) market access the effect of a 1% increase in the corresponding market access 
term increases GDP per capita by 0.05% in case of SSA and SSA+ROW market access and 
by 0.08% in case of ROW market access. 
 
6.  Additional Results: Robustness Checks, Human Capital and Policy Shocks 
6.1  Robustness of the results 
The last four columns of Table 5 constitute our baseline results. One could still raise several 
issues that would invalidate these results. First, even though we have corrected for fixed time 
and country effects and have added two additional control variables, there is the issue of 
endogeneity. The assumption under which our baseline results are valid is that, after 
                                                 
30 Also controlling for natural resource dependence (by including a dummy for oil exporting countries and/or the 
percentage of ores and metals in merchandise trade) leaves the results on market access unaffected. Including 
these proxies for natural resource dependence does however significantly reduce the number of observations so 
that we decided to report the results without these two proxies in the paper. Results are available upon request.   24
controlling for fixed effects and our two included controls, the remaining error term is 
uncorrelated with our measures of market access. One way in which this may be violated is 
when the error term still contains other variables influencing a country’s GDP per capita that 
are correlated with market access. Another way is reverse causality: when market access not 
only influences GDP per capita but GDP per capita in turn also influences marker access, the 
error term would by construction be correlated with market access and thus give biased 
estimates of the effect of our measures of market access. 
  To control for both possible sources of endogeneity
31, we employ an instrumental 
variable approach by using the distance to the USA and South Africa as instruments (see 
Figure 1) for our measures of market access
32. The first four columns of Table 6 show that our 
results remain unaffected (also note that our instruments pass both the overidentification and 
instrument relevance tests): all variants of market access still positively and significantly 
affect GDP per capita. Note however that the instruments are time-invariant, which precludes 
the use of country-fixed effects. Comparing our results to the first four columns of Table 5 
(that also excludes country-fixed effects) thus provides the best insight into the effect of 
controlling for endogeneity by using our instruments. We observe that the coefficient on SSA 
market access (and also that on total and ROW+SSA market access, that are largely made up 
of SSA market access, see Table 3) is much larger, whereas the coefficient on ROW market 
access is much lower. The results on human capital and density are largely unaffected. 
Given the choice of instruments, the inability to control for fixed country effects 
constitutes a drawback of the IV-estimates. Columns 5-8 of Table 6 hence show the results 
when one includes each market access measure lagged one period (the human capital and 
density measure are also lagged one period). This arguably controls for one of the three main 
reasons of possible endogeneity problems when estimating the NEG wage equation that 
usually receives most attention, i.e. reverse causality, while still allowing for the inclusion of 
country-fixed effects. Comparing these results to the last four columns in Table 5 shows that 
reverse causality does not seem to be a major issue, and, most importantly, we still find a 
positive effect of each of the market access variables on SSA’s GDP per capita. 
 
 
                                                 
31 It also controls for the third way by which endogeneity issues may be raised, i.e. measurement error. 
32 Distance to major markets is often used as an instrument in empirical studies in NEG, see e.g. Redding and 
Venables (2004) and Breinlich (2006). When considering total or SSA+ROW market access we use both 
distances as instruments, when considering SSA or ROW market access by itself, we use only distance to South 
Africa in case of SSA and only distance to the USA in case of ROW market access.   25
Table 6 Robustness of the results – IV, lagged MA, and 1
st differences (FD) 
dep: log GDP per 








lagged FD FD FD FD 
log  tot  ma  0.427 - - -  0.077 -  -  -  0.033 - - - 
robust  0.000 - - -  0.003 -  -  -  0.011 - - - 
bootstrapped  - - - -  0.005 -  -  -  0.013 - - - 
log ssa+row ma  -  0.392  -  -  -  0.053  -  -  -  0.027  -  - 
robust  -  0.000  -  -  - 0.013 -  -  -  0.024  - - 
bootstrapped  -  - -  -  - 0.010 -  -  -  0.024  - - 
log row ma  -  -  0.232  -  -  -  0.102  -  -  -  0.035  - 
robust -  - 0.059 -  -  -  0.013  -  -  - 0.214 - 
bootstrapped  - - - -  -  - 0.022 -  - -  0.241  - 
log  ssa  ma  - - -  0.376 -  -  - 0.048  - - -  0.025 
robust  - - -  0.000 -  -  - 0.014  - - -  0.024 
bootstrapped  - - - -  -  -  - 0.024  - - -  0.031 
adult illiteracy  -0.007 -0.012 -0.023 -0.012 -0.025  -0.023  -0.022  -0.022  -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 
robust 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.029  0.044  0.054  0.051  0.676 0.681 0.746 0.695 
bootstrapped -  -  -  -  0.040 0.069 0.085 0.054  0.674 0.688  0.732  0.703 
log working pop / km2 
arable  land  0.175 0.173 0.054 0.180 0.258  0.264  0.286  0.268  0.066 0.060 0.051 0.060 
robust 0.000 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.068  0.061  0.044  0.059  0.727 0.751 0.787 0.751 
bootstrapped -  -  -  -  0.095 0.106 0.043 0.076  0.748 0.774  0.796  0.774 
                     
p-value  country  FE  no  no  no  no  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
p-value  time  FE  0.838 0.927 0.999 0.937 0.849  0.891  0.828  0.894  0.345 0.356 0.407 0.352 
nr  observations  369 369 369 369  369  369  369  369  328 328 328 328 
R2  0.990 0.988 0.992 0.9871 0.961  0.960  0.960  0.960  0.082 0.076 0.070 0.076 
F-statistic  41.45 35.38  66.33  57.63 -  -  -  -  - - - - 
p-value  F-test  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 -  -  -  -  - - - - 
p-value  overID-test  0.845 0.631  - -  -  -  -  -  - - - - 
Notes : p-values below coefficients. Bootstrapped p-values on the basis of 200 replications. 
 
Our final robustness check again concerns the way we dealt with the unobserved country-
specific variables that are correlated with our measures of market access. In our baseline 
results we capture these by including country-fixed effects. Another standard way of doing 
this is by estimating (12) in first differences. Compared to the fixed effect estimation, first 
differencing requires less strict assumptions regarding the exogeneity of lagged error terms 
(fixed effect requires strict exogeneity, i.e. any lagged error is uncorrelated with the included 
explanatory variables, whereas first differencing requires this for the first lag of the error 
process only). The last four columns show the results of estimating the wage equation (12) in 
first differences. The effect of market access, although slightly lower than when using fixed 
effects, is still significant and positive. The only substantial difference lies in the fact that 
ROW-market access is no longer significant (see also Table 4).  
Overall, the positive effect of SSA-MA that we find is most robust, indicating that 
current efforts to improve SSA-MA in particular, such as the Trans-Africa highway network 
that is being developed by among others the United Nations Economic Commission for   26
Africa, the African Development Bank and the African Union (see also e.g. Buys, et al., 
2006), are likely to contribute positively to economic development in the SSA region. 
 
6.2   Human capital and market access 
Besides the direct effect of a country’s market access, Redding and Schott (2003) argue that it 
may also have an indirect effect through the accumulation of human capital. They show 
theoretically that if manufacturing is relatively skill and trade cost intensive, countries with 
better access to international markets will experience increased incentives to invest in the 
education of their workforce. They also provide empirical evidence to back up their claim 
using a sample of 106 countries. Breinlich (2006) finds similar empirical evidence of a 
positive effect of market access on human capital when considering European regions. 
   
Figure 3 : Market Access and Human Capital 
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Notes: the raw correlations of each of the market access variants with the adult illiteracy rate are (p-values in 
brackets): total: -0.46 (0.00); row + ssa: -0.35 (0.00); row: -0.19 (0.00); ssa: -0.33 (0.00). 
 
Our baseline results in Table 5 showed that controlling for human capital still leaves a 
positive and significant direct effect of market access on GDP per capita. In this subsection 
we are concerned with a possible indirect effect of market access on income levels through its   27
effect on human capital. Figure 3 shows that we also find a strong positive correlation 
between market access and human capital (as measured by the adult illiteracy rate) when 
considering our sample of 48 SSA countries. Interestingly, the correlation with ROW market 
access is somewhat weaker than with SSA (and also ROW+SSA and total) market access. 
Table 7 provides estimation results to assess the relevance of market access for human 
capital. It shows the results of regressing a logistic transformation of adult illiteracy 
(following Redding and Schott (2003) this makes sure that illiteracy is bounded between 0 
and 1) on each of our four measures of market access while controlling for the positive effect 
of income per capita on human capital. The results confirm the positive relationship between 
total market access and human capital levels (remember that our dependent variable is adult 
illiteracy), even after controlling for income levels. Strikingly, we do not find evidence of 
such a positive relationship when considering only ROW market access. The significant 
positive effect of total (and ROW+SSA) market access seems to be entirely driven by the 
cross-country variation in SSA market access.  
 
Table 7 : Human capital and Market Access  
dep:  adult  illiteracy  ols ols ols ols 
log tot ma  -0.143  -  -  - 
robust  0.000  - - - 
bootstrapped  0.000  - - - 
log ssa+row ma  -  -0.110  -  - 
robust -  0.000  -  - 
bootstrapped -  0.000  -  - 
log row ma  -  -  0.048  - 
robust -  -  0.307  - 
bootstrapped -  -  0.324  - 
log ssa ma  -  -  -  -0.091 
robust  - - -  0.000 
bootstrapped  - - -  0.000 
        
log GDP per capita  -0.488  -0.549  -0.630  -0.559 
robust  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bootstrapped  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
nr  observations 369 369 369 369 
R2  0.389 0.373 0.342 0.369 
Notes : p-values below coefficients. Bootstrapped p-values on 
the basis of 200 replications. 
 
To check whether these results regarding human capital depend on our measure of human 
capital, we also collected data on three different measure of human capital, namely youth (= 
under 25) illiteracy, the gross secondary enrolment rate and the primary completion rate. As   28
can be seen in column 2 of Table 8, the coverage of the last two variables is, however, much 
poorer than both illiteracy variables.  
 
Table 8   Other Human Capital variables 
human capital variable 
correlation with 
adult illiteracy  nr. observations
 





adult illiteracy  1  369  -0.143 (0.00)  0.076 (0.00)  -0.021 (0.05) 
youth illiteracy  0.97 (0.00)  369  -0.197 (0.00)  0.064 (0.00)  0.016 (0.10) 
gross 2nd enrolment  -0.67 (0.00)  277  0.289 (0.00)  0.055 (0.02)  0.002 (0.12) 
primary completion rate  -0.82 (0.00)  242  0.196 (0.00)  0.105 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.58) 
Notes: p-values in brackets. 
 
Together with the fact that adult illiteracy is highly correlated with the other three measures of 
human capital (see column 1 of Table 8), this is the main reason for us to include adult 
illiteracy in our baseline estimates of the wage equation in the previous section. When 
regressing a logistic transformation of any of the other three human capital measures, column 
4 of Table 8 also shows that we always find a positive effect of market access on human 
capital. In addition, as shown in the last two column of Table 8, when substituting either of 
the other three human capital measures for adult illiteracy in our baseline regression (see 
Table 5), we always find a positive effect of market access, whereas the human capital 
variable is not always significant any more. 
 
6.3   Policy experiments 
Our results clearly show the importance for the SSA countries of improving their market 
access, both with the rest of the world as well as (or even more importantly so) with other 
SSA countries. Besides this, our estimation results also help to gain insight into the relative 
effect of different policies or shocks aimed at improving a country’s market access. As has 
already been discussed in section 4 (see also Redding and Venables (2004), section 7), the 
inclusion of country-specific variables in the trade equation, (9), allows us to perform policy 
experiments for both country-specific (e.g. infrastructure improvements, or efforts to end civil 
conflict) and country-pair specific variables (e.g. entering a regional or free trade agreement). 
The extent to which these policy measures improve a country’s market access can first be 
inferred from the 1
st step of our analysis, the estimation of the trade equation. Next, the effect 
of the resulting improvement in market access on GDP per capita easily follows from the 
estimated coefficient of market access shown in our baseline estimation results (Table 5). 
Table 9 and Figure 4 show the results of six such “policy” experiments. Four experiments 
focus on conflict-ridden Sudan and two on landlocked Ethiopia.    29
Table 9: Policy experiments 
policy measure:  + 1 s.d.  
infrastructure 








country:  Sudan  Sudan Sudan Sudan  Ethiopia 
% increase in market access 
total  64.0 144.7  85.2 5.6 40.9 
ROW+SSA 81.1  144.7  104.3  8.9  80.9 
ROW 27.1  144.7  102.4  0.0  22.6 
SSA 89.4  144.7  104.7  10.6  99.1 
resulting % increase in GDP per capita 
total  MA  4.9 11.0  6.5 0.4 3.1 
ROW+SSA-MA  4.3  7.7 5.6 0.5 4.3 
ROW-MA  2.3 12.0  8.5 0.0 1.9 
SSA-MA  4.4  7.2 5.2 0.5 4.9 
 
First the results for Sudan: ending the civil war (Darfur) in that country would increase its 
market access the most
33 and raises its GDP per capita by around 10% depending on the 
measure of market access (and subsequent estimate of its effect on GDP per capita). This 
shows the devastating impact of civil unrest on SSA’s economic development in general. 
Hypothetically halving Sudan’s distance to all its trading partners also increases market 
access substantially and would increase GDP per capita by about 6.5%. Of particular interest 
are the effects of investments in infrastructure and the establishment of regional free trade 
agreements. The results show that improving Sudan’s infrastructure by one standard deviation 
(resulting in a quality of infrastructure comparable to Namibia) would raise GDP per capita 
by about 5%, whereas forming a bilateral RFTA with South Africa would only raise its GDP 
per capita by 0.4%. The reason for this difference is that improvements in infrastructure affect 
all trading partners alike, whereas the establishment of a bilateral RFTA only affects one 
trading partner. This gives a clear policy recommendation: policies aimed at improving a 
country’s ability to trade will have a much higher pay-off when they aim at general 
improvements that affect as many of that country’s trading partners as possible.  
An example of such an ‘all-trade-partners-affecting’ experiment is the one shown for 
Ethiopia in Table 9. When Eritrea officially became independent in 1993, Ethiopia lost its 
direct access to the sea. Table 9 shows that if this had not taken place Ethiopia’s market 
access would ceteris paribus have remained much better, resulting in an improvement of its 
GDP per capita of about 3 to 4%.  
 
                                                 
33 Note that the % increase in total market access is the same as for each of its subcomponents as we do not allow 
the coefficient on civil war to be different when considering intra-SSA trade or SSA trade with the ROW when 
estimating the trade equation (see Table 2).   30
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The final experiment that we conducted is not so much concerned with improving a country’s 
market access by trade cost reducing policies, but instead it focuses on the spatial reach of a 
one-time positive exogenous shock in Ethiopia’s GDP of 10%. This improves other countries’ 
market access through the increased demand from Ethiopia for their products, and the more 
so, the lower their trade costs with Ethiopia. Figure 4 shows the resulting increase in GDP per 
capita in other countries plotted against their distance to Ethiopia. Given the estimated penalty 
on distance in SSA the positive spatial spillover effect of Ethiopia’s GDP shock quickly 
peters out. Ethiopia’s nearby neighbors (Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan), and partly  
also reflecting the positive border effect in Table 2, benefit the most from the increased 





The role of geography in explaining Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor economic performance is 
often confined to its absolute geography, focussing on e.g. its hostile disease environment or 
poor climate. This paper focuses on a different role of geography and establishes the 
importance of relative geography for economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
Using an empirical strategy grounded upon a new economic geography model, our paper is 
                                                 
34 The overall effect is small compared to some of the trade cost experiments, this is again due to the fact that for 
all the affected countries, Ethiopia constitutes only one of many trading partners (and mostly also a relatively 
unimportant one).   31
among the first to test for the importance of market access and thereby of economic 
geography in explaining the observed differences in economic development between SSA 
countries. Building on the framework introduced by Redding and Venables (2004), we first 
construct measures of market access for each SSA country where we rely on trade data to 
reveal the relative importance of trade costs and market size in determining each country’s 
market access. In doing so, we explicitly allow for a different impact of trade costs on intra-
SSA trade and SSA trade with the rest of the world (ROW), and subsequently decompose 
each country’s total market access into market access to other SSA countries and into market 
access to the ROW respectively.  
Using the thus constructed measures of market access, we estimate the impact of 
market access on GDP per capita, again distinguishing explicitly between the relevance of 
intra-SSA and ROW market access. Based on our sample of 48 SSA countries over the period 
1993-2002, we find that market access invariably positively affects income per capita. We 
furthermore show that this finding is robust to controlling for other variables affecting 
economic development (most notably human capital), controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity by allowing for country (and year) specific fixed effects, and to instrumenting 
market access by distance to major markets.  
Arguably even more interesting is the finding that, among our market access measures, 
intra-SSA market access has a relatively large (and moreover the most robust) impact on 
economic development. Our findings indicate that the current efforts to improve SSA 
infrastructure by e.g. the Sub-Saharan African Transport Policy Program or The Infrastructure 
Consortium for Africa, or the aim of the African Union to increase intra-SSA integration will 
improve SSA access to markets and be successful in stimulating economic development. This 
is further strengthened by our finding of a possible additional indirect effect of market access 
on income levels through improvements in human capital (as argued Redding and Schott, 
2003).  
Above all, see also Henderson, Shalizi and Henderson (2001), our results are a 
reminder that distance or relative geography matters for economic development. Despite room 
for (policy-induced) improvements in market access, the (economic) remoteness of Sub-
Saharan Africa remains a main deterrent to its economic development 
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Appendix A.   Data definitions and sources 
 
GDP (also per capita and per worker) 
Gross Domestic Product (also per capita and per worker), from Penn World Tables 6.2, if not 
available (for Angola, Haiti, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus in 
selected years) from World Bank Development Indicators 2003 or World Bank Africa Database 
2006.  
Distance: Great circle distance between main cities, from CEPII. 
Internal distance 
This often-used specification of Dii reflects the average distance from the centre of a circular disk 
with areai to any point on the disk (assuming these points are uniformly distributed on the disk). 
It is calculated on the basis of a country’s area: ()
1/2 2/3 / ii i Da r e a π = . 
Contiguity: Dummy variable indicating if two countries share a common border, from CEPII. 
Common official language 
       Dummy variable indicating if two countries share a common official language, from CEPII 
Common colonizer 
Dummy variable indicating if two countries have been colonized by the same colonizer, from 
CEPII. 
Colony – Colonizer relationship 
Dummy variable indicating if two countries have ever had a colony-colonizer relationship, from 
CEPII. 
Landlocked: Dummy variable indicating if a country has no direct access to the sea. 
Island: Dummy variable indicating if a country is an island. 
Infrastructure index 
Following Limao and Venables (2001), the index is constructed as the unweighted average of four 
variables (each normalized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation 1 over the whole sample 
period as well as in each year). As Limao and Venables (2001) I ignore missing values, making 
the implicit assumption that the four variables are perfect substitutes to a transport services 
production function. The four components are: 
- Roads: Km road per km2, from World Bank Development Indicators 2003, World Bank 
Africa Database 2006 and Canning (1998). 
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- Paved roads: Km paved road per km2, from World Bank Development Indicators 2003, 
World Bank Africa Database 2006 and Canning (1998). 
- Railways: Km railways per km2, from Canning (1998). 
- Telephone main lines: Telephone main lines per 1000 inhabitants, from World Bank 
Development Indicators 2003, World Bank Africa Database 2006 and Canning (1998). 
African regional or free trade agreement 
Dummy variable indicating if two countries are both a member of one of the following African 
regional or free trade agreements: ECOWAS, ECCAS, COMESA, SADCC, UEMOA, CEMAC 
(or UDEAC), EAC, IGAD or CENSAD. 
Civil conflict 
Dummy variables indicating if a country experienced the use of armed force between two parties, 
of which at least one is the government of a state that resulted in at least 25 and at most 999 
battle-related deaths, from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. 
Civil war 
Dummy variables indicating if a country experienced the use of armed force between two parties, 
of which at least one is the government of a state that resulted in at least 1000 battle-related 
deaths, from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. 
% rural population 
Share of the population living in rural areas, from World Bank Development Indicators 2003 and 
World Bank Africa Database 2006. 
% labor force in agriculture 
Average proportion of the total labor force recorded as working in agriculture, hunting, forestry, 
and fishing (ISIC major division 1) over the period 1993-2002. Labor force comprises all people 
who meet the International Labour Organization’s definition of the economically active 
population, from World Bank Development Indicators 2003 and World Bank Africa Database 
2006. 
Adult illiteracy 
The percentage of the population that is 25 years and older that cannot read or write, from World 
Bank Development Indicators 2003 and World Bank Africa Database 2006. 
Youth illiteracy 
The percentage of the population under 25 that cannot read or write, from World Bank 
Development Indicators 2003 and World Bank Africa Database 2006. 
Gross secondary enrolment 
Gross enrolment ratio is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Secondary education completes 
the provision of basic education that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the 
foundations for lifelong learning and human development, by offering more subject- or skill-
oriented instruction using more specialized teachers, from World Bank Development Indicators 
2003 and World Bank Africa Database 2006. 
Primary completion rate 
Primary completion rate is the percentage of students completing the last year of primary school. 
It is calculated by taking the total number of students in the last grade of primary school, minus 
the number of repeaters in that grade, divided by the total number of children of official 
graduation age, from World Bank Development Indicators 2003 and World Bank Africa Database 
2006. 
Working population per km2 of arable land 
Data on the working population and the km2 of arable land are separately taken from the World 
Bank Development Indicators 2003 and the World Bank Africa Database 2006. 
Oil exporter 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not a country is exporting oil. From the World Bank 
Africa Database 2006. 
Exports of ores and metals 
       Exports of ores and metals as a percentage of total merchandise trade. From the World Bank  
       Africa Database 2006. 
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Appendix B.  
 
Table A1 : The Trade Equation Estimates – OLS on the non-zeroes 
(valid under the assumption of exogenous sample selection) 
dependent variable  ln  trade 
estimation method  OLS 
time period  1993-2002 
Variable coefficient  variable coefficient 
ln distance  -0.778  island exp  0.354 
ln internal distance  0.728  island exp ssa  -1.244 
ln distance ssa  -0.050**  island imp  0.060** 
ln GDP imp  0.752  island imp ssa  -0.393 
ln GDP imp ssa  -0.370  ln infrastructure exp  0.314 
ln GDP exp  0.936  ln infrastructure exp ssa  0.649 
ln GDP exp ssa  -0.224  ln infrastructure imp  0.177 
colony – colonizer  2.106  ln infrastructure imp ssa  0.492 
common colonizer  0.634  RTA or FTA  -0.601 
common colonizer ssa  -0.201*  RTA or FTA ssa  1.358 
Contiguity  -1.057  civil conflict imp  -0.291 
Contiguity ssa  1.959  civil conflict exp  -0.521 
common off language  0.558  civil war imp  -0.457 
common off language ssa  -0.326  civil war exp  -0.978 
landlocked exp  0.025**  % rural population imp  -0.061** 
landlocked exp ssa  -0.699  % rural population exp  -1.976 
landlocked imp  -0.436  % in agriculture imp  0.008** 
landlocked imp ssa  0.335  % in agriculture exp  0.022** 
dummy ssa trade  10.981  dummy internal trade  2.842 
nr observations  34615 
Notes : ** (*) denotes NOT significant at the 5% (1%) respectively. 
 
Table A2  Baseline Results - Market Access constructed with the coefficients in Table A1 
 BASELINE 
dep: log GDP per capita  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
log tot ma  0.134  -  -  - 
robust  0.000  - - - 
bootstrapped  0.001  - - - 
log ssa+row ma  -  0.080  -  - 
robust -  0.008  -  - 
bootstrapped -  0.015  -  - 
log row ma  -  -  0.114  - 
robust -  -  0.035  - 
bootstrapped -  -  0.046  - 
log ssa ma  -  -  -  0.073 
robust -  -  -  0.009 
bootstrapped -  -  -  0.012 
adult  illiteracy  -0.020 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
robust  0.053 0.097 0.116 0.106 
bootstrapped  0.074 0.104 0.192 0.146 
log working pop / km2 arable land  0.312  0.313  0.328  0.313 
robust  0.038 0.037 0.029 0.037 
bootstrapped  0.062 0.063 0.048 0.055 
           
p-value  country  FE  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value time FE  0.283  0.382  0.444  0.383 
nr  observations  369 369 369 369 
R2  0.967 0.965 0.965 0.965 
Notes : p-values below coefficients. Bootstrapped p-values on the basis of 200 replications. CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
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